Cyber Resilience Testing and Facilities: Mapping, Critique, and the Path Forward

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Between February and March 2025, I analysed the UK’s Cyber Resilience Testing (CRT) initiative and its associated Cyber Resilience Test Facilities (CRTFs). From that research, I developed three articles: one mapping the global standards landscape, one examining CRT’s practical challenges, and one exploring its role as a trust label. Together, they present CRT as a promising but evolving approach: not yet a standard, but under active NCSC development and consultation, with the potential to reshape product-based assurance if given clarity, support, and ecosystem alignment.

Contents

Table of Contents

Introduction: Why Cyber Resilience Testing Matters

In 2025, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) set out a vision to transform product assurance. The goal was to move away from self-attestation and static compliance — which too often fail to capture real-world resilience — towards independent, principles-based testing delivered through Cyber Resilience Test Facilities (CRTFs).

This approach — Cyber Resilience Testing (CRT) — is about putting products in the dock, probing them from the outside as an adversary would, and publishing evidence-based assurance. Done well, it could close the gap between standards on paper and security in practice.

At its core, CRT is about product-based assurance. Instead of relying on manufacturers’ promises or static paperwork compliance, it puts devices into independent test facilities where they are evaluated against real-world threats and resilience principles. The aim is to demonstrate, with evidence, that a product can withstand attack — not just that it has been designed with good intentions.

It is important to stress that CRT is not yet a fixed standard, but an approach in evolution. The NCSC is actively developing, testing, and consulting on the methodology, with industry and government partners contributing feedback. This is a process of refinement, not immaturity: the ambition is clear, but the precise mechanisms are still being worked through in collaboration with the wider ecosystem.

The NCSC’s stated vision is a national ecosystem of assured test facilities, providing buyers with confidence that the connected products they purchase have been tested against resilience principles. This represents a significant shift: a move from compliance box-ticking towards risk-based outcomes, aligning with broader global debates about how to make product assurance meaningful.

Between February and March 2025, I undertook a research exercise to map the CRT initiative, explore its positioning, and critically assess its prospects. The results were distilled into three linked articles, which I now bring together here in summary and sequence.

Article I: Mapping the Global Security Landscape — Where CRT Fits (and Where It Doesn’t)

Mapping the Global Security Landscape — Where CRT Fits (and Where It Doesn’t)

This first piece sets the stage by mapping the existing global ecosystem of consumer product cybersecurity standards, regulations, and schemes. From the UK’s PSTI Act to the EU’s Cyber Resilience Act, ETSI EN 303 645, ISO/IEC 27400, IEC 62443, UL IoT Security Rating, and Singapore’s Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme, the article highlights both the density of initiatives and the persistent gaps.

Key findings:

  • Overlap and fragmentation remain serious challenges: manufacturers face a patchwork of requirements, risking duplication and confusion.
  • Consumer awareness is minimal: even where schemes exist, buyers rarely understand or act upon them.
  • Neglected device classes (cheap smart devices, toys, wearables) remain poorly covered.
  • CRT’s opportunity lies in complementarity — not as another scheme, but as a validating layer, testing whether implementations actually work.

Article II: The Future of Cyber Resilience Testing — Reflections on a Scheme in Transition

The Future of Cyber Resilience Testing: Reflections on a Scheme in Transition

The second article asks harder questions: can CRT succeed as a scheme, and what are the blockers?

It analyses costs, usability, demand, and delivery, drawing on survey data and stakeholder conversations.

Main points:

  • Costs to vendors are a sticking point. SMEs are price-sensitive, and larger organisations want clear ROI. Without demand signals from procurement or insurers, uptake will be weak.
  • Programme delivery costs are significant. CRT will not sell itself — it needs sustained communications, intermediaries, and policy backing.
  • Audience maturity is uneven. Current CRT reports risk being too technical for SMEs or procurement officers to use.
  • Strategic positioning of NCSC is unclear: is this a government standard, a market service, or a hybrid?
  • Who wants it, and why now? remains unresolved. CRT risks being a solution in search of a problem unless buyers actively demand it.

The conclusion: CRT has real promise but risks being “respected but underused” unless it sharpens its purpose, delivery model, and stakeholder alignment.

Article III: Trust, Labels, and the Path to Meaningful Security — Rethinking CRT Adoption

Trust, Labels, and the Path to Meaningful Security: Rethinking CRT Adoption in the UK

The final article steps back to consider the behavioural dimension: CRT as a trust label.

It compares CRT to other labelling schemes — Singapore’s CLS, the EU’s CE Mark, US NIST/FCC pilots, and even food hygiene and energy efficiency stickers. The insight: trust requires visibility, simplicity, and iteration.

Key takeaways:

  • CRT is necessary but not sufficient. It must evolve into a cultural shorthand for security, not just a technical assessment.
  • Its value proposition is dynamic: early adopters gain reputational advantage; mid-stage adopters join once procurement demands it; late adopters comply once it becomes unavoidable.
  • Stakeholder needs differ: SMEs need affordability; retailers need consumer-friendly materials; consumers need intelligible signals; government needs policy alignment.
  • The recommendation: build a CRT Playbook — with tiered models, public adoption metrics, consumer education campaigns, and integration into procurement.

The conclusion: CRT must be treated as a living standard, evolving iteratively, backed by communications and policy, if it is to avoid the fate of other forgotten voluntary schemes.

Overall Reflections: The State of Cyber Resilience Testing in Early 2025

Looking back at this body of research, a few overarching reflections stand out:

  1. Conceptually right, practically fragile. CRT fills a real gap — testing resilience, not just compliance. But without demand drivers, cost models, and clear outputs, it risks low uptake.
  2. Not just technical — behavioural. Standards succeed when they change behaviour across consumers, buyers, and vendors. CRT must embed into culture and procurement, not just labs.
  3. Ecosystem building is required. The NCSC cannot deliver this alone. Retailers, insurers, regulators, and industry bodies must align to make CRT visible and valuable.
  4. Evolution, not decree. Like food hygiene ratings or CE marking, CRT will need iteration, stakeholder buy-in, and visibility campaigns to reach critical mass.

Conclusion: A Work Still in Progress

As of February–March 2025, Cyber Resilience Testing was at an inflexion point: well-conceived, potentially transformative, but facing significant hurdles of cost, clarity, and cultural uptake.

The three articles capture different aspects of this journey:

  • Article I maps the crowded standards landscape and CRT’s potential fit.
  • Article II interrogates costs, delivery, and demand.
  • Article III reframes CRT as a trust signal that must evolve to be meaningful.

Together, they tell a story of a promising initiative still finding its footing. Whether CRT becomes a cornerstone of product assurance or another forgotten scheme depends on the clarity of its purpose, the strength of its ecosystem, and the willingness of stakeholders to make trust visible.

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